This book argues that the effectiveness of friendshoring depends heavily on the regime type of the countries involved. While friendshoring presents strategic opportunities, its success is not uniform and varies significantly based on the political context of the host country. The book shows that in autocracies, where decision-making is more centralized and less constrained by competing interests, the benefits of friendshoring may be more readily realized, particularly when bilateral relations are strong. In such contexts, autocratic regimes can quickly implement policies that favor foreign investment, making it easier for aligned nations to secure economic advantages. Conversely, in democracies, the institutional checks and balances that typically protect against arbitrary decision-making can also impede the swift implementation of policies that favor specific foreign investments, even when political ties are strong. The book explores how the very features of democratic governance—such as opposition parties, regional governments, and public opinion—can limit the effectiveness of friendshoring by complicating or delaying policy adjustments.